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Abstract
With technological advancements, traditional
single-factor authentication methods, such as
passwords, have become more vulnerable to
cyber-threats. One potential solution, multi-factor
authentication (MFA), enhances security with additional
steps of verification. Yet, MFA has a slow adoption rate
among users, and frequent data breaches continue to
impact online and real-world services. Little research
has investigated users’ understanding and usage of MFA
while specifically focusing on the their mental models
and social behaviors in a work setting. We conducted
semi-structured interviews with 28 individuals (11
experts, 17 non-experts), while focusing on their
risk perceptions, MFA usage, and understanding of
required technologies. We identified that experts
treated MFA as a useful added layer of authentication,
while non-experts did not perceive any additional
benefits of using MFA. Both non-experts and experts
expressed frustration with MFA usage, often referring
to it as a ‘chore.’ Based on these findings, we make
several actionable recommendations for improving the
adoption, acceptability, and usability of MFA tools.
1. Introduction
The increased usage of online applications has
been challenging for cybersecurity. Identity theft
and phishing are rising concerns [1], with 76%
of global organizations reporting phishing attacks in
2018 alone [2]. As a solution, authentication and
authorization has been the major backbone of access
control for online applications and services [3]. It
provides identity verification of a user through trusted
device(s), granting resource access to the verified
entity [4]. Traditional single-factor authentication
(SFA) methods, like passwords, have served as the
primary authentication strategy for a long time [5].
However, under the increasing complexity of threats on
the Internet, passwords [6] are susceptible to several
security vulnerabilities [7]. Thus, we cannot rely on SFA
for mission-critical sectors, such as finance, health care,
or government [8]. In addition to traditional passwords,
multiple factors of authentication are proposed as a
solution to mitigate such issues, including federated
sign-on, graphical passwords, biometrics, hardware
tokens, visual tokens, and others [9, 10].
Multi-factor authentication (MFA) has been
proposed to address vulnerabilities in SFA systems [11]
by adding multiple layers of authentication[12]. In
addition to asking for the passphrase, called “what
you know,” MFA enhances security by requiring the
presence of other factors for successful user identity
verification, like “what you are” and “what you
have” [13]. Common secondary methods include
personal identity verification devices (smart cards,
USB tokens) [14, 15], time-based one-time password
tokens (HMAC-based token applications, hardware
tokens) [16], and the combination of bio-metric
(fingerprints, face) [17] and hardware security devices
(TPM, Secure Enclave) [18]. Popular examples of this
system include mandatory verification codes for online
banking [19] and FIDO U2F authentication tokens [20].
Despite its benefits, usability and acceptability of
MFA tools still remains a challenge, based on users’
risk perceptions [21, 22]. Das et al.’s work was
focused on understanding users’ experience with 2FA
adoption. While we were motivated by their work, we
focus on understanding users’ mental models and risk
perceptions regarding online data security.
To help us understand users’ perceptions of MFA
technology, we conducted semi-structured interviews,
where we asked users about their daily interaction
with passwords, 2FA, and MFA tools and devised a
sketching exercise followed by questions regarding their
risk perception. We specifically addressed the following
research questions:
• RQ1. What are user’s risk perceptions of online
threats?
• RQ2. How does computer and security expertise
level affect adoption of MFA tools?
• RQ3. What are the common perceptions and
understandings of how authentication methods,
such as passwords, 2FA, and MFA work?
• RQ4. How are authentication methods applied in
work and personal settings by users?
Our study shows how users’ expertise levels can
impact the adoptability (and thus, effectiveness) of
security tools. Our research not only reveals detailed
encounters with MFA through the interviews, but also
further explores users’ risk perception. We provide
critical details about applications of MFA tools in
work and educational settings. We detail background
literature exploring authentication technologies and risk
mental models in section 2. Section 3 provides a
detailed description of the study protocol, followed by
the critical findings of the study in section 4. We
conclude with the major factors that prevent MFA’s wide
adoption, while discussing our findings in section 5 and
recommendations in section 6.
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2. Related Work
While multi-factor authentication dramatically
improves online data security, a slow rate of MFA
adoption has been observed due to negative user
perception of MFA technologies [23]. Security and
usability are both essential for ensuring secure access
control [24]. Current security and privacy tools, such
as Tor [25], Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) [26], and
MFA [27] have been found to have certain negative
impacts on the user experience, which prevents them
from being widely and correctly utilized. For instance,
in the case of PGP, users experienced usability issues
due to the complexity of Public Key Infrastructure
(PKI) [28, 29]. While implementing new tools to
enhance security, researchers and practitioners often
forget about the users’ expertise in the domain, which
leads to knowledge and usage problems [26].
2.1. Multi-Factor Authentication
Traditional MFA involves two or more methods for
identity verification beyond the factor of “what you
know”. Popular methods utilize strong, definitive, and
real-time, triangulated verification [30] to ensure users’
identity and achieve security. Current common methods
have their own advantages and limitations, depending on
the application and users’ expertise. Nag et al. proposed
a new MFA system that eliminates the traditional static
procedure of enrollment. Instead, factors such as
devices’ fingerprints, users’ behavior, and geo-location
data are continuously collected in a dynamic, adaptive,
and continuous multi-factor authentication scheme [31].
In the context of authentication, such factors are verified
together with a passphrase. It achieved additional
security while lessening the burden for users to use the
same set of authentication processes in less trustworthy
environments.
Huang et al. applied a distributed and decentralized
robust MFA system at a large scale [32]. Existing
multi-factor technologies primarily rely on a centralized
set of servers, which adds the risk of a single
point of failure. A distributed design helps to
improve the availability of service and adds to users’
confidence [33]. Bhargav et al. pointed out that the risk
of identity theft increases with the adoption of biometric
authentication systems [34]. In the context of privacy,
Jiang et. al examined and enhanced the practice of
hashing biometrics to removes personally identifiable
information (PII) [35].
Paepcke et al. interviewed information workers
in multiple technical areas to understand the needs of
users in technical work settings and provided design
recommendation for improved information search and
retrieval [36]. Their work provided tools for designing
usable computer and information management systems.
These technological advancements in MFA and security
enhancing tools in general, improve security to a great
extent; however, the same cannot be said for the users’
acceptance of these tools. Thus, through our research,
we sought to understand the user perspective.
2.2. User Expertise and Security Awareness
Rajivan et al. provided evidence of a correlation
between users’ knowledge level and users’ security
behavior by studying 898 participants and their security
practices [37]. Gallagher et al. also showed that
expertise level is a strong determinant of usage patterns
in Tor [38]. Stanton et al. discussed the correlation
between users’ technological expertise and their security
awareness [39]. These previous works found users’
security expertise was aligned with their risk perception
and attempts to protect their data, and they characterized
security behaviors from “basic hygiene” to “intentional
destruction.”
Albayram et al. studied the difference between the
2FA/MFA adoption rate among users after watching
introductory videos of MFA based on three themes (risk,
self-efficacy, and contingency) [40]. They identified
a higher adoption rate after viewing the videos on
self-efficacy and risk. They suggested improvements
on user education of risk awareness and development
of self-efficacy. Despite the impact of security expertise
on actual practices, studies on two-factor or multi-factor
authentication have seldom explored the impact of
expertise level, with a few exceptions [21, 15, 10].
We integrated the expertise knowledge with the usage
and perception of MFA to understand the correlation
between these two key elements that enhance security
hygiene. We also integrated survey-based factor
analysis along with interviews to ensure we have more
accurate data from our participants. Additionally, to
explore users’ risk mental models, we adopted the
sketching method by Gallagher et al. [38].
2.3. User Experience of MFA
Braz et al. pointed out that human factors and
graphical user interface (GUI) design impact users’
overall experience with multi-factor authentication [24].
Das et al. studied users’ experiences with FIDO
U2Fs and revealed that issues with enrollment and
verification have caused troubles for users choosing to
use the hardware token [21]. Weir et al. conducted
experiments in the scenario of phone-based banking
and suggested that such additional verification slowed
down the banking process [41]. Reynolds et al.
studied the YubiKey, where they focused on cases of
MFA usability in desktop and web applications and
identified major user failures in a majority of U2F
applications, especially during the on-boarding (setup)
procedures [42]. Colnago et al. studied the user
experience of MFA in the context of organization-wide
deployment, such as universities [43]. They collected
data from the university’s IT office for detailed statistics
on MFA usage. They suggested improvements in
implementation design and strategic messaging for
better user adoption.
In our research, we explore the usability and
acceptability of MFA technologies by analyzing users’
attitudes towards new technology, while exploring
users’ technological awareness. Our study on mental
models based on previous studies [44, 45] will help the
research community in understanding users’ pain points
with MFA usage while guiding technology experts
through design and architectural recommendations.
3. Methods
To answer the RQs mentioned in section 1, we
performed a series of organized studies regarding users’
expertise and MFA experience. These methodological
approaches include an extension of Gallagher et al.’s
studies on Tor [38], a semi-structured interview, and a
qualitative analysis of user reviews of MFA applications
and services. Figure 1 shows a snapshot of our study
design and participant workflow.
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3.1. Recruitment and Data Collection
We recruited participants for survey and real-world
studies through flyers, mailing lists, social media, and
advertisements across other platforms. We conducted
pre-screening surveys to learn about their technological
interactions. We then conducted semi-structured
interviews with a selected set of participants and
implemented a sketching exercise to evaluate their
risk perceptions, specifically focusing on online data
authentication and authorization. The subsections below
describe the details of our recruitment procedure and
study design. The protocol and the study was approved
by the organization’s ethical review board.
3.2. Pre-Screening Survey
For recruitment, our aim was to find users who
come from diverse backgrounds with a common
interest in MFA tools. We evaluated their expertise
based on pre-defined and researched survey questions
implemented in research studies by Das et al. [21] and
Rajivan et al. [37]. Many of the participants expressed
frustration and distress when they had to use MFA/2FA
as a mandatory authentication for any of their personal
or professional activities. One hundred twenty-seven
participants answered our pre-screening survey. We
particularly selected those participants who use MFA in
their daily life in some capacity in order to understand
the usability issues faced across different platforms.
3.3. Participants
Based on our pre-screening survey, we set up
semi-structured interviews focusing on the MFA
day-to-day usage of individuals who expressed interest
in participating in the study. Overall, we interviewed
28 individuals, who were asked to perform a sketching
exercise. We also had a brief survey at the end of
the interview where participants were asked a few
MFA-related questions. Apart from ensuring that each
participant was above the age of 18, we did not collect
personally identifiable information to respect the privacy
concerns of the participants.
3.4. Study Protocol
Figure 1. Flow Chart of the Study Protocol
As introduced by Kearney and Kaplan [46] and
implemented in the Tor study by Gallagher et al. [38],
we also developed a sketching exercise after the
interview for the participants to explain what they think
about authentication technologies. We first asked them
to draw about the most common SFA technique, which
is passwords. Next, we asked them to draw what they
thought about 2FA, and finally, they drew about MFA.
Many participants felt hesitant to express their thoughts
through their drawings, since they felt that they would
be evaluated based on their artistic abilities. Thus, we
addressed their concerns and transcribed how they felt
while sketching in order to avoid any artistic influence
on their understanding of the concepts of authentication.
After the interview and the sketching exercise,
we asked the participants to fill out a post-interview
questionnaire, where they answered questions about
their MFA usage and tools they use to implement
multi-factor authentication, ranging from simple
messaging-based one-time passwords to biometric
authentication. In the post-survey, we also asked
computer and security expertise questions to answer
our research questions. Our standardized factor analysis
is based on previous work by Rajivan et al. [37]. As
shown in Figure 2, those who scored more in the
qualified conditions in either computer questions or
security questions (adjusted with final precision factors)
were termed as ‘Experts,’ while those who did not
meet at least one category of the standard were termed
as ‘Non-Experts.’ We also asked questions about the
nine dimensions of risks to analyze the threat models
of the users. The nine dimensions of risk perception
are: Voluntary, Immediacy, Control, Science, Expertise,
Catastrophic, Chronic, Severe, and Newness [47], as
detailed in section 4.1.
Transcription and Coding: Before starting the
semi-structured interview, we provided the participants
with details regarding how their data will be stored or
accessed. As mentioned, we did not store any personally
identifiable information about the participants and used
pseudonyms for analysis purposes. We then took
consent from the participants to record (audio)
the conversations. Two researchers transcribed
the audio recordings of the interview, which were
verified by a third researcher to avoid any data loss
or misinterpretation. The interviews ranged from
anywhere from 20 minutes to an hour. Though difficult
and time consuming, the researchers did not use any
tools apart from the audio recording device at low
speed to transcribe the data due to privacy concerns.
Once the transcription was done and verified by another
researcher, we started the qualitative coding procedure.
All the interviews were taken in-person, and
we specifically avoided any telephone or virtual
conversations, since our study protocol required a
sketching exercise. All the interviews were conducted
by the primary researcher of the paper. Most of the
questions asked were open-ended questions to allow
the participants to express what they felt about their
daily MFA and 2FA interactions. We are using 2FA
and MFA interchangeably here, since many participants
considered their work server or their work computers
as another mode of authentication. To delve deeper,
we specifically asked users to compare and contrast
between 2FA and MFA. Though a small fraction of
participants understood the difference, most of them
considered 2FA as the only MFA they know about. If
asked further, some expressed other factors, which we
have described in detail in section 4.
The qualitative coding consisted of three steps- open,
axial, and selective coding [48]. Two researchers, who
were trained in qualitative coding, coded a subset of
the transcribed data and generated a list of 136 codes.
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Later, these open codes were grouped to create axial
codes, and we performed selective coding to specifically
answer questions about mental models, threat models,
expertise influence, frequency of usage, willingness to
use, and others. The researchers met two times each for
the different stages of coding; for open coding, codes
from both the researchers were considered to maintain
an open subset. Both the researchers then met to group
them into axial coding. For the selective coding, the
two researchers coded the set separately and found an
inter-rater reliability rate of 76.8%. This followed a
round of open discussions, based on which another
round of coding was conducted, where the inter-rater
reliability rate was noted as 89.5%. Based on the second
round of discussions of the selective coding, the data
was analyzed.
Factor analysis: For all questions in the survey
related to computer and security expertise, weight-based
scores were given to each component. Some of the
options were presented as a binary choice (i.e. yes or
no), while others were presented as a 5-point Likert
scale, from strongly disagree to strongly agree. We
assigned values from -2 to 2 for degree-based questions.
All the questions were based on the model of Ravijan et
al. [37]’s work, and we performed factor analysis using
the validated weight model. The weight assignment
chart is presented in Figure 2. Certain components have
negative contributions to factorized scores. We define
“Computer Experts” as people who have computer
expertise scores over 3 out of 5 in our questionnaire
and “Security Experts” as people who have security
expertise score over 2.4 out of 4. More details have been
provided in section 4.
Figure 2. Weight Assignment for the Factor Analysis
with Explanation of Precision Scores
These categories provided an important baseline
standard for our findings, as explained in section 4,
where we performed clustered and factorized analysis
on specified metrics.
4. Findings
Our findings uncovered that users were aware of
online security threats, but they occasionally failed to
take proper mitigation procedures, including utilizing
security tools. While experts demonstrated a systematic
understanding and usage of multi-factor authentication,
non-experts showed a lack of knowledge about MFA,
a failure to distinguish between 2FA and MFA, and
limited usage of MFA. Furthermore, both groups of
users identified issues and concerns with current MFA
technology.
4.1. Risk Perception
We evaluated risk perceptions across users through
nine parameters: Voluntary, Immediacy, Control,
Science, Expertise, Catastrophic, Chronic, Severe, and
Newness. Table 1 describes users’ knowledge of
security threats such as phishing. We primarily focused
on explaining the online risk in terms of phishing,
since a majority of users (72.8%) expressed a good
understanding of phishing as a common cybersecurity
attack. While the data showed that users were aware of
online threats, a significant portion of users expressed
an inability to mitigate security threats using proper
resources.
Perceptions Agree Disagree
Voluntary 14 14
Immediacy 22 6
Control 10 18
Science 17 11
Expertise 12 16
Catastrophic 26 2
Chronic 23 5
Severe 27 1
Newness 22 6
Table 1. Evaluation Factors of Risk Perception
The nine risk perception (Agree-Disagree) based
questions were:
1. Voluntary - I can control the risk of my online
account being taken over or being phished.
2. Immediacy - The harm of being locked out of my
account would be immediate.
3. Control - If I am exposed to online risk, I can
mitigate the harm.
4. Science - Experts understand phishing and know
how to protect me from it.
5. Expertise - I understand phishing and know how
to protect myself.
6. Catastrophic - Phishing is widespread and
affects many people, and not only for targeted
individuals.
7. Chronic - Phishing is everywhere, it’s a constant
exposure.
8. Severe - The effects of phishing are very severe.
9. Newness - Phishing is a new kind of risk.
4.2. User Expertise
Unsurprisingly, we found significant differences
between expert and non-expert user perceptions
of MFA tools and general security awareness.
Experts demonstrated a high level of understanding
of multi-factor authentication, while non-experts
misinterpreted and oversimplified it. Notably, not all
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technologically-aware users exhibited a higher level
of security expertise, indicating that technological
knowledge might not always correlate with security
expertise. Based on the methodology adopted and factor
analysis performed by Ravijan et al. [37], we adjusted
the weight distribution by calculating the precision
score for the expertise evaluation. The precision score
was developed by conducting the expertise evaluation
among 30 randomly sampled participants different from
the sampled participants for our experiment. We found
that the mean scores for security expertise was 120 and
that of computer expertise was 150. Based on these
scores, the precision scores were calculated as 0.94
for computer expertise and 1.29 for security expertise.
Without any precision score adjustment, the maximum
score a participant can gain for security expertise was
3.1 and 5.3 for computer expertise.
Any participant was termed as an expert if they had
more than 60% on these scores. For a participant to
be a security expert, they needed to score more than
2.8 and for computer expert, they needed to score more
than 3.5. Figure 2 mentions the process of expertise
calculation. We define expert as participants that were
qualified as expert in at least one of the expert groups,
and by that definition, we have 11 users as experts and
17 as non-experts in total.
4.3. Mental Models
During the interview, we attempted to discover
the participants’ understandings of MFA through
semi-structured interviews (developed based on
previous studies, such as those by Camp [49] and Liu
et al. [50]) and sketching exercises. While both groups
of participants (experts and non-experts) expressed
frustration with MFA usage, the experts showed a better
understanding of how MFA works than the non-experts.
Experts Treat MFA as Additional Verification:
The experts understood the concept of authentication,
as well as MFA. When describing how authentication
works, the experts focused on the verification combined
with certain factors. For example, one participant
demonstrated the authentication flow in a sketch. In
Figure 3, the expert explained the particular factor
of passwords, as well as other factors’ usage in the
authentication process, such as a door to the house.
It was interesting to find how users indicated their
personal space and physical safety with authentication
technology and online data protection. We kept
the interpretation and representation open-ended for
those who were not entirely comfortable drawing;
thus, participants also wrote a few words alongside
the sketches. In another interview, one expert user
pointed out that additional factors provide additional
verification: “It is another kind of verification” (P1,
Expert)
Typically, the experts viewed MFA from the
perspective of having multiple protective layers.
Moreover, most of them were able to identify duplicated
factors in multi-factor authentication. For instance,
one expert stressed that all points of security should
be distinct from each other in order to avoid device
dependencies. In the interview, another expert
compared two-factor authentication and multi-factor
authentication as shown in Figure 4. Keys are an
important component of protection in the real world, and
many users represented MFA using the same analogy.
Figure 3. An Expert’s Understanding of the
Multi-Factor Authentication Flow and Other Factors
Figure 4. An Expert’s Sketch of a 2FA/MFA
Comparison
Non-Experts View MFA as a Security Service:
Most non-expert users treated MFA as “added security.”
They did not care about the internal implementation of
the authentication system or other factors, but instead
focused on the result. For instance, one non-expert
participant described MFA as “another protection.” But
none of them were clear about what MFA protected
them from. They perceived MFA as a necessary ‘chore,’
and they often indicated that they would opt out of it
given the choice: “It is kind of double protection,
but I guess my password is secure enough and this is
unnecessary.” (P2, Non-expert)
“...it is frustrating to use MFA, specifically while I
am working on something important. I do not think I
need so much protection for my data.” (P3, Non-expert)
Non-experts also found MFA to be useless and
thought that additional layers of security increased their
workload to a point where they found little to no
benefits. For instance, a non-expert user felt that 2FA
added trouble to daily authentication and that MFA
added even more.
Unlike the experts, few non-expert users were able
to identify the different modes of MFA (e.g. FaceId,
TouchId, passcodes, etc.) However, they realized that
multi-factor authentication provided more security for
online applications. Most of the non-expert users
presented MFA using methods-based approaches in the
sketching exercise. For instance, non-expert P11 drew
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SPF protection as well as a sun umbrella to explain the
effects of MFA. Figure 5 shows that they knew what
2FA/MFA is in theory, as they linked it with a real
life example of protecting themselves under the sun.
However, when asked what they are protecting through
MFA, they were unsure: “I guess, it will protect my
account. I don’t know how it will do it. It is unnecessary.
Sometimes, you might not want to have any sunscreen
lotion to protect yourself from the sun. How about you
want a tan?” (P11, Non-expert)
Figure 5. One Non-Expert Uses a Metaphor to
Explain How Multi-Factor Authentication Works
Non-experts failed to distinguish MFA from 2FA.
Many non-experts did not understand what MFA is at
all; for 2FA, they could relate one-time passwords, voice
authentication, or even push notifications. However,
they seldom thought that more than two-factors were
necessary. One participant explained: Passwords are
enough! 2FA is in itself a hassle, let alone be other
factors. How can they hack my phone and my password,
they cannot! (P7, non-expert)
Apart from noting the non-expert treatment of
multi-factor authentication as a service, we also
identified that a few non-expert users treated the first
MFA service vendor they used as a representation of
all MFA tools. For instance, in interviews where we
asked users about their understanding of two-factor
authentication and MFA, their answers referred to a
particular service vendor: “Is that a Duo?” (P2,
Non-expert)
4.4. Discovery and Use of MFA
We examined how the participants started to utilize
multi-factor authentication and their motivations for
doing so. Both experts and non-experts showed a
willingness to protect their high-value accounts using
MFA technology, but the non-experts reported issues
in successfully finding the MFA enrollment system.
We asked participants about their intentions to protect
accounts using MFA technologies and about other
approaches they planned to use for protecting accounts.
Among expert users, four out of 11 (36.7%) indicated
they would protect all accounts using MFA, and the
others indicated that they protect work-related assets
using MFA. Among the non-expert users, six out of 17
(35.3%) indicated that they would protect all accounts,
two did not prefer to protect any accounts using MFA,
and the others preferred to just protect work assets.
Experts’ Password Behavior and MFA Preferences:
Among expert users, most participants exercised the
recommended safety procedures for creating and
managing passwords, using unique passwords for each
website to mitigate the risk of password breaches.
Four participants also reported the usage of password
managers for password generation and storage, and
three explained their awareness of memorization issues
for long passphrases (which is one motivation for using
technological methods for password management).
One user explained their intention to replace traditional
passwords with biometrics. Expert users expressed a
consistently strong preference for modern technologies,
such as security keys and mobile notifications, for
multi-factor authentication. However, one expert was
also not satisfied with the extra time cost in launching
MFA applications. Two of them also preferred
biometrics for multi-factor authentication. In addition,
six expert users expressed concerns about the actual
security provided by security questions.
Non-Experts’ Password Behavior and MFA
Preferences: Non-expert users showed a generally
positive trend in their password management behavior.
However, four of them did not utilize long or complex
passphrases, due to the inconvenience of memorizing
them. Ten non-experts expressed an interest in trying
security keys. For multi-factor authentication, 47% of
non-experts (N = 8) preferred security keys. Nearly
all of them preferred code delivery via text messages,
all of them favored applications, and 14 preferred
code delivery using emails. In contrast to experts, the
majority (N = 13) of non-expert users did not express
negative opinions about security questions; however,
they were concerned (N = 5) about biometrics. A few
non-expert users were also unfamiliar with security key
technology.
Mandated Usage and High-Value Accounts: We
assessed users’ willingness to protect high-value assets
using multi-factor authentication. Among average
and expert users, most of them expressed an intention
to protect critical accounts using some sort of MFA
technology:
“So like social media I know for your emails likely
they will. I just feel like it is a lot more useful than people
take it for. I really, I honestly think that security wise
which is one of the biggest things now and MFA is such a
big thing that keeps your information safe” (P1, Expert)
“I would be more careful about my bank account,
bank accounts should be secured.” (P3, Non-expert)
Surprisingly, when we asked users about what they
were currently using for multi-factor authentication,
a significant portion of participants (experts and
non-experts) said they only used the technology
assigned by their organization. Some participants
reported that they were unaware of other MFA
technologies: “Because I don’t know of anymore...I
only use Duo because that was the one provided to me”
(P1, Expert)
A few participants presented their understanding
of multi-factor authentication using an illustration of
the technology (Duo) that is widely deployed across
organization as expressed in the sketch 6
Dependency on Mobile Devices: Both groups of users
reported concerns about the dependency on mobile
devices in current MFA implementations. This data
is skewed by the fact that most of the users used a
particular MFA app, Duo1, which was suggested by their
respective organization. A few participants mentioned
security keys, but they noted that they do not know much
about them. With Duo, there is a mobile device and
1https://duo.com/
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Figure 6. One Participant’s Sketch (Left) that
Demonstrated the Duo User Interface (Right).
application dependency; thus, the participants pointed
out circumstances that caused temporary or permanent
access interruption. While both groups expressed
concerns about the dependency issue, experts insisted
on having more security while not having a single point
of failure. Non-experts provided problematic aspects
of app-dependent MFA, such as connection issues or
not having their phone accessible. None of them had
knowledge of any fail-safe methods. “Sometimes the
Internet connection is not good with my phone” (P2,
Non-expert)
“My professor came to the lecture, then try to log in
but he couldn’t because he didn’t have his phone. The
lecture cancelled.” (P2, Non-expert)
“My phone is died of battery, then I cannot reach my
phone. The system is very time-consuming, it does not
support disabilities especially I have a situation right
now that on my hand, it burdens me with extra work in
my busy life” (P3, Non-expert)
We analyzed these issues mentioned to enhance our
implications in section 6:
• Connection Issues: User is unable to respond due
to connection issues.
• Battery Outage: User is unable to respond to a
multi-factor authentication challenge or view the
TOTP code due to a power outage.
• Device Presence: User is unable to access the
device in a short period of time.
• Device Lost: User is unable to access the device
or even recover the account because it is lost.
5. Discussion
Our evaluation of risk perception levels revealed
a primary reason for non-expert users failing to
take security measurements seriously and enroll in
multi-factor authentication. While a significant portion
of users realized the catastrophic consequences and
urgency of security threats, a few of them had trouble
with understanding risk mitigation and protection. As
a result, these users failed to utilize MFA. Table
2 summarizes participants and the expectations of
multi-factor authentication use from these users. We
found that most users believe that MFA is a good
mechanism to enhance their information security.
However, due to the knowledge differences between
user groups, a few non-expert users believed that MFA
is optional and not necessary at all times. Moreover,
non-expert users would only apply MFA in workplace
environments, which typically have IT management
enforcement.
We see a positive correlation between expertise and
MFA usage. Expert users have a good understanding
of both computers and security, and they showed a
respective understanding and utilization of multi-factor
authentication. They understood operational knowledge
and definitions of factors, as well as the risk of online
applications and the coverage of protection. In contrast,
non-experts occasionally failed to tell the difference
between 2FA and MFA and treated it as a redundant
security measure. As a result, our research identified
a certain group of participants in information security
that chose not to enroll in multi-factor authentication
because they were confident in their existing security
measures. These users had at least an average level
of computer expertise. Users with poor computer
expertise often lack security expertise, but the exit
test results indicate that they have the potential for
improvement. To ensure that multi-factor authentication
is more accessible to average users, usability issues in
current implementations need to be properly addressed.
The experts showed an active usage of multi-factor
authentication, while other users had trouble with
service discovery. In organization-wide scenarios, this
issue was not revealed, since the information was clearly
delivered to all users. For instance, in the sketches,
a majority of users drew the Duo technology - which
is utilized across the organization- instead of other
common multi-factor authentication services. When it
comes to a variety of online services, average users can
have trouble locating security settings. The proactive
way of prompting users to enable 2FA, however, might
frustrate them during the login flow.
Regardless of user expertise, all users showed
concerns regarding losing access to the companion
device. Current threat models in multi-factor
authentication do consider the case when a mobile
device gets lost: sometimes a recovery code is provided,
for instance. But there is no guarantee that users have
properly stored it. In the survey, we found that average
users are likely to experience circumstances such as data
loss. In an organizational scenario, this vulnerability
is mitigated by having a dedicated IT support person.
However, it is necessary to introduce the recovery
mechanism to average users in order to improve MFA
adoption.
Addressing these issues uncovered by our findings
would improve MFA usage within non-expert groups.
6. Implications
Our findings can be applied to improve MFA in
a variety of ways. These include enhancing user
education by putting more proactive information in
the user interface, eliminating the sole dependency
on mobile devices by introducing new verification
technologies, and improving the procedures for disaster
recovery.
User Interface Improvement: Non-experts
occasionally encountered issues in service discovery.
A feature that prompts for multi-factor authentication
enrollment should be prompted immediately after their
first successful password authentication. It might also
be useful to move settings entries for multi-factor
authentication to areas that are easier to discover (e.g.
the home page of account settings).
Eliminate Mobile Dependency: Our findings
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Category Expert Users Non-Expert Users
Risk Perception Well understand and control Less knowledge, have no mitigation
and control
Mental Model of MFA Additional factor and verification in
authentication
Optional security service, lack of
operational knowledge
MFA Usage Frequency Frequent Less-frequent
MFA Usage Scenarios All accounts when possible Specific, work-related
Table 2. Categories of Users and their Correlation with MFA
suggest that the dependency on mobile devices is
one of the biggest roadblocks for the expansion of
multi-factor authentication. Both groups of users
expressed their distrust in the reliability of their mobile
devices. To address the issue with mobile devices,
new technologies can be developed to enable Secure
Element [51] and remote attestation using trusted
platform modules [52] for verifying the factor of “what
you have.” Additionally, environment fingerprinting
and comparisons can be utilized for identifying a user’s
presence.
Proper and Effective Risk Communication: The
evaluation of risk perception levels indicated that proper
and effective risk communication from the service
provider to the user is necessary in order to improve
their awareness of information security. A possible
solution is to use proactive notifications in services to
allow the user to understand new security threats, as
well as review security settings. To provide even better
protection, service providers can suggest recommended
security settings to users.
Factor Disaster Recovery: Our participants reported
that the recovery procedures for account access in
case of device loss are complicated and sometimes
not possible. Current implementations [53] involve
pre-generated passphrases for account recovery. Apart
from eliminating the dependency on devices, such as
phones, that are easy to lose or can be damaged beyond
repair, a new mechanism that combines users’ past
activities and behavior into recovery can be developed
as an overlapping authentication strategy. For instance,
service providers could ask users ten questions about
their behaviors in certain time periods for verifying
their identity in the event of recovery.
Prioritized Authentication: Certain applications,
such as online banking and stock exchange sites, need
higher assurance levels during authentication. In other
circumstances, users have preferences for authentication
methods. A multi-factor authentication implementation
could determine the importance of the authentication
and select the proper authentication method based on
the user’s choice. This would give control to the user
and thus enhance the user experience. However, it is
worth noting that many users feel that their personal
emails are not confidential or important enough, so
proper risk communication is useful during such
scenarios.
Time-Sensitive Adjustment: One usability issue
users repeatedly mention is MFA occasionally
causing interruptions when authenticating. For
certain time-sensitive scenarios, current MFA
implementations cannot satisfy users’ needs. A
new MFA implementation that recognizes and adjusts
configuration settings based on a service application’s
priority can be implemented. This can be achieved
through a trusted device implementation, where
frequently used devices could be trusted during times
when users have a meeting. Work devices often have
their calendar linked, so this can be achieved.
Removal of Redundant Authentication: Current
MFA technology often comes with duplicated factors.
Despite the fact that the factor of possession (phone)
has already been verified when a user logs in to a
site via their phone’s browser, MFA implementations
send requests to the phone for confirmation. In such
situations, MFA implementations can check for factors
that verify the device’s possession, such as the device
identifier [54] or browser and sensor fingerprinting [55]
to speed up the authentication process.
7. Limitations and Future Work
Our analysis of individuals’ mental models
regarding authentication technologies provides several
opportunities for future research on the user experience
and multi-factor authentication. In section 6, we
propose potential solutions that involve changes in the
user interface of online applications and technologies
with MFA implementations. The effectiveness of
these suggestions needs to be validated using empirical
studies. Due to the qualitative nature of our study, our
findings are derived from a small sample. To assess
external validity, a large-scale online questionnaire
could be developed based on these findings for a
broader population. However, the qualitative nature of
the study helped us get in-depth knowledge of users’
risk perception, MFA usage, and frustration, which
large-scale studies might fail to capture. Although we
focused on general implementations of multi-factor
authentication, further research is needed to examine
the differences between specific technologies. While
we collected important information to answer our
specific RQs, we did not collect demographic data, such
as gender and race, for privacy consideration; thus,
future work can expand the research to learn about
demographic and cultural differences.
8. Conclusion
Multi-factor authentication is an important defense
against information security breaches in the modern
connected world. It mitigates the risks of password
breaches in the wake of increasingly frequent online
attacks. While expert technology users have a good
understanding of authentication and online security
threats, a significant portion of Internet users are not
experts in technology. These non-experts are less
likely to take necessary actions for mitigating risks and
protecting their online data security. Comprehensive
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security can only be achieved by enhancing the usability
of security tools. Our research on the mental models of
MFA users emphasizes the importance of understanding
their risk perceptions. From a technological perspective,
improvements on MFA should be made to provide more
accessible tools that cater to users without technical
backgrounds. To improve users’ risk awareness, proper
and effective communication and education on risks and
security measurements should be established by service
providers and administrators. Promoting complete
understanding of authentication concepts and security
awareness is important for expanding the usage of
multi-factor authentication and reducing the risks of
future cyberattacks.
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